Sophie Horowitz
UMass Amherst
Department of Philosophy
E325 South College, 150 Hicks Way
Amherst, MA 01003-9269
email: shorowitz at umass.edu
Here is my CV.
I am a Professor of Philosophy at UMass Amherst. I work on epistemology. More specifically, I am interested in higher-order evidence, permissivism, and accuracy. I am also interested in ethics and practical rationality.
Before coming to UMass, I taught for two years at Rice University. Before that, I was a graduate student at MIT. My dissertation focused on the relationship between epistemic rationality and truth. And before that, I went to Swarthmore College and studied philosophy and studio art.
Right now I'm working on a book about accuracy and guessing, Guesswork, under contract with Princeton University Press. Please email me for draft chapters.
Do Credences Model Guesses? [2025] Do credences model guesses? Noûs 59, 409–424. [abstract]
Are You Now or Have You Ever Been an Impermissivist? A conversation among friends and enemies of epistemic freedom. [2024] (with Sinan Dogramaci and Miriam Schoenfield.) In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. [abstract]
Higher-Order Evidence. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). URL https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/higher-order-evidence/.
Shrinking Three Arguments for Conditionalization. [2021] Philosophical Perspectives 35(1): 303-319. [abstract]
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily. [2022] (with David Builes and Miriam Schoenfield.) Noûs 56(1): 3-20. [abstract]
The Truth Problem for Permissivism. [2019] The Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):237-262. [abstract]
Predictably Misleading Evidence. [2019] In Matthias Skipper Rasmussen and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, eds Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, OUP. [abstract]
Accuracy and Educated Guesses. [2019] In Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6. [abstract]
*Winner of the 2015 Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology.
Epistemic Utility and the "Jamesian Goals". [2017] In Jeffrey Dunn and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism, OUP. [abstract]
Uniqueness: A New Argument. [2016] (with Sinan Dogramaci). Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind. 130-147. [abstract]
Respecting All the Evidence. [2015] (with Paulina Sliwa). Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858. [abstract]
Expecting the Unexpected. [2015] (with Tom Dougherty and Paulina Sliwa), Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321, special issue on transformative experience. [abstract]
Epistemic Akrasia. [2014] Noûs 48 (4):718-744. [abstract]
Immoderately Rational. [2013] Philosophical Studies 167(1):1-16. [abstract]
Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, Rationality & Reflection. Mind 125 (498): 565-569. [pdf]
[good paper]
[bad paper]
[scavenger hunt]
Please feel free to email me for other teaching materials as well. I regularly teach Medical Ethics, Junior Year Writing (more here), Intro to Epistemology, and various grad seminars including Proseminar and assorted topics in and around epistemology.
Before coming to UMass, I taught for two years at Rice University. Before that, I was a graduate student at MIT. My dissertation focused on the relationship between epistemic rationality and truth. And before that, I went to Swarthmore College and studied philosophy and studio art.
Right now I'm working on a book about accuracy and guessing, Guesswork, under contract with Princeton University Press. Please email me for draft chapters.
Published/Forthcoming
Plans, Learning, and Deferring [2026] Plans, Learning, and Deferring. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 126 (1):21–38. [abstract]Do Credences Model Guesses? [2025] Do credences model guesses? Noûs 59, 409–424. [abstract]
Are You Now or Have You Ever Been an Impermissivist? A conversation among friends and enemies of epistemic freedom. [2024] (with Sinan Dogramaci and Miriam Schoenfield.) In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. [abstract]
Higher-Order Evidence. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). URL https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/higher-order-evidence/.
Shrinking Three Arguments for Conditionalization. [2021] Philosophical Perspectives 35(1): 303-319. [abstract]
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily. [2022] (with David Builes and Miriam Schoenfield.) Noûs 56(1): 3-20. [abstract]
The Truth Problem for Permissivism. [2019] The Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):237-262. [abstract]
Predictably Misleading Evidence. [2019] In Matthias Skipper Rasmussen and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, eds Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, OUP. [abstract]
Accuracy and Educated Guesses. [2019] In Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6. [abstract]
*Winner of the 2015 Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology.
Epistemic Utility and the "Jamesian Goals". [2017] In Jeffrey Dunn and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism, OUP. [abstract]
Uniqueness: A New Argument. [2016] (with Sinan Dogramaci). Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind. 130-147. [abstract]
Respecting All the Evidence. [2015] (with Paulina Sliwa). Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858. [abstract]
Expecting the Unexpected. [2015] (with Tom Dougherty and Paulina Sliwa), Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321, special issue on transformative experience. [abstract]
Epistemic Akrasia. [2014] Noûs 48 (4):718-744. [abstract]
Immoderately Rational. [2013] Philosophical Studies 167(1):1-16. [abstract]
Book Reviews and Symposia
Symposium piece on Richard Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Episteme. [draft]Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, Rationality & Reflection. Mind 125 (498): 565-569. [pdf]
Teaching Stuff
Here are some example papers I created, along with a scavenger hunt. Please feel free to borrow these. Comments welcome. I wrote about the assignment here.[good paper]
[bad paper]
[scavenger hunt]
Please feel free to email me for other teaching materials as well. I regularly teach Medical Ethics, Junior Year Writing (more here), Intro to Epistemology, and various grad seminars including Proseminar and assorted topics in and around epistemology.